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Abstract 
 
Psychoanalysis today is a whole trend in culture. It has gone far ahead of its naturalistic basis. Its individual branches 
no longer have a direct connection with the founder of the teaching. 
The paper presents analysis of the scientific and social status of psychoanalysis. The evolution of psychoanalytic 
teaching, its methodological and epistemological specificity are considered. The main directions of philosophical and 
scientific research are highlighted in which the use of psychoanalytic ideas and methods may have a heuristic value for 
science and philosophy. 
Scientific research methods will include study, analysis, synthesis, comparison of scientific literature on the topic of 
the paper. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Throughout the twentieth century, psychoanalysis remained the brightest and most influential 
phenomenon in the culture of civilization. Psychoanalysis is one of the few teachings that really 
changed our culture penetrating into the public consciousness, transforming the worldview of an 
entire era. 
Psychoanalysis is the same age as the twentieth century. The same age as its long-suffering 
culture and therefore its human content reflects the content of those sufferings and torments, 
those tragic searches and errors that the intellectual experienced as a result of social cataclysms, 
physical and spiritual losses, loss of soulfulness and humanistic illusions [17]. 
Discussion of psychoanalysis in modern philosophy and science is conducted in several 
directions. It is impossible to single out any particular vector of discussion or give a unified 
assessment of this 20th century phenomenon. There is a rich tradition of deep understanding of 
psychoanalysis. It covers many schools generated by the work of Freud himself and other 
psychoanalysts; various syncretic directions arising at the junction of psychoanalysis and other 
disciplines; a whole body of critical works devoted to the methodological and scientific-
theoretical values and perspectives of psychoanalysis [17]. 
However, a variety of material in this area does not contribute to a clear understanding of the 
problem. What is the specificity of the psychoanalytic approach? Is psychoanalysis able to 
benefit the modern philosophy and science? 
 
  
2. Materials and methods 
 
2.1. Psychoanalytic theory and status of the psychoanalysis 
 
This chapter considers Anglo American and European approach to determining of the 
psychoanalysis status.  
Psychoanalytic theory is an overarching term encompassing a range of perspectives, with 
contemporary theory being influenced by object relations and relational theorists, who adopt a 
two-person analytic perspective, and recognize the significance of intersubjectivity. That is, the 
caricature of the traditional analyst abiding by neutrality, has been replaced by an empathic 
approach sensitive to the “here-and-now” relationship between self and other. Furthermore, the 
approach is phenomenological, in the sense of privileging the immediate experience of the 
participants-in-relationship. This perspective has been incorporated into both self-psychology, 
and the development of relational psychoanalysis [18]. 
 The problem of the psychoanalysis status is viewed in a completely different context in the 
Western world. There is no doubt that psychoanalysis has become an important part of culture 
with two forms of its interpretation being observed. Clinical psychoanalysis is especially popular 
in the Anglo-American tradition including a developed network of influential institutions that 
focuses on psychotherapeutic practice for a rich minority of society which conditions its elite 
status and inclusion in the social establishment. 
The main psychoanalytic studies are devoted to the problems of increasing the effectiveness of 
psychotherapeutic treatment, describing new methods and diseases, as well as the problems of 
“applying” psychoanalytic methodology to the phenomena of the cultural and social being of a 
person (social psychology, sociology, literary criticism, management, PR, etc.). Such studies are 
called “applied psychoanalysis” in contrast to classical clinical psychoanalysis.  
In European countries, especially in France and Germany, psychoanalysis is included in the 
context of university education either as a separate discipline or as a subject of study for other 
disciplines, primarily philosophy. N.S. Avtonomova names this approach "university 
psychoanalysis". A detailed revision of the fundamental principles is carried out in the 
“university psychoanalysis”. The analysis of theoretical constructs and teaching methodology 
from the standpoint of the most advanced achievements of social and humanitarian knowledge, 
the practical and socio-critical possibilities of psychoanalysis are revealed. Thus, synthetic trends 
continue to actively influence the intellectual field of modern Europe [2]. 
 Thus, the actual therapeutic problematics goes into the background. Psychoanalysis becomes 
a source of inspiration for a wide range of authors who draw from it not conceptual ideas or 
theoretical constructs (they are recognized as obsolete) but metaphors for subsequent 
interpretation in the context of contemporary problems of society and their own theories. 
 
2.2. Four aspects determining the very essence of psychoanalytic technique. 
 
The chapter deals with the description of psychoanalytic techniques form the point of view of 
their application to community using scientific approach. 
Interpretation 
Interpretation is the verbal communication by the analyst of the hypothesis of an unconscious 
conflict that seems to have dominantly emerged now in the human’s communication in the 
therapeutic encounter. In general, interpretation of a defense or a defensive relationship initiates 
the interpretative process, followed by the interpretation of the context, or the impulsive 
  
relationship against which the defense was erected, and the analysis of the motivation for this 
defensive process.  
Interpretative interventions may be classified into: a) clarification, by which the analyst 
attempts to clarify what is consciously going on in the human’s mind; b) confrontation, that is, 
tactful bringing into awareness nonverbal aspects of the human’s behavior; and c) interpretation 
proper, the analyst’s proposed hypothesis of the unconscious meaning that relates all these 
aspects of the human’s communication to each other. This condensing hypothesis is 
interpretation “in the here and now”, to be followed or completed with interpretation “there and 
then”, that is, the genetic aspects of interpretation that refer to the human’s past, and link the 
unconscious aspects of the present with the unconscious aspects of the past [14]. 
Transference analysis 
Transference may be defined as the unconscious repetition in the here and now of pathogenic 
conflicts from the past, and the analysis of transference is the main source of specific change 
brought about by psychoanalytic treatment.  
The classical concept of transference analysis has been expanded significantly by the concept 
of the analysis of the “total transference” proposed by the Kleinian approach [14]. This involves a 
systematic analysis of the transference implications of the human’s total verbal and nonverbal 
manifestations in the hours as well as the human’s direct and implicit communicative efforts to 
influence the analyst in a certain direction, and the consistent exploration of the transference 
implications of material from the human’s external life that, at any point, he/she brings into the 
session.  
The inclusion of a systematic consideration of the patient’s total functioning at the point of the 
activation of a predominant transference points to an important implicit consequence of 
transference interpretation, i.e., the analysis of character. Defensive characterological patterns 
tend to become dominant transference resistances and lend themselves to systematic analysis 
leading to characterological modification. This is a significant effect of psychoanalytic treatment, 
surprisingly underemphasized in the literature [15]. 
Technical neutrality  
Technical neutrality tends to be misinterpreted as a recommendation for an analyst’s distant, 
uninvolved attitude, “a mirror to the human’s presentations”. In essence, it simply refers to the 
analyst’s not taking sides in the human’s activated internal conflicts, remaining equidistant, as A. 
Freud [5] put it, from the human’s id, ego, and super ego, and from his/her external reality. 
Technical neutrality, in addition, implies the analyst’s not attempting to influence the patient with 
his/her own value systems. S. Freud’s early metaphor of the analyst as a “mirror” clearly was 
questioned by himself, and he protested against a view of analytic objectivity as “disgruntled 
indifference” [9].  
Technical neutrality also implies the concept of “abstinence”, in the sense that the analytic 
relationship should not be utilized for the gratification of libidinal or aggressive impulses of the 
patient or the analyst. In contrast, technical neutrality does not imply the concept of “anonymity”, 
a questionable development in psychoanalytic thinking in the 1950s, importantly related, in my 
view, to authoritarian pressures within psychoanalytic education, and the related institutionally 
fostered idealization of the training analyst, who should not show any usual personal human 
characteristic to the patient. This idealization of the analyst has been sharply criticized in recent 
years, particularly by the relational school.  
Technical neutrality implies a natural and sincere approach to the human within general 
socially appropriate behavior, as part of which the analyst avoids all references or focus upon 
his/her own life interests or problems. The analyst cannot avoid that personal features emerge in 
  
the treatment situation, and do become the source of transference reactions. The human’s realistic 
reaction to realistic aspects of the analyst’s behavior should not be considered a transference 
reaction: not everything is transference! Maintaining the definition of transference as an 
inappropriate reaction to the reality presented by the analyst, that reflects the activation of the 
human’s unconscious conflicts, should differentiate transference from other human’s realistic 
reactions to natural, as well as idiosyncratic, aspects of the treatment situation [9]. 
Countertransference 
Countertransference is the analyst’s total, moment-to-moment emotional reaction to the human 
and to the particular material that the human presents. The contemporary view of 
countertransference is that of a complex formation co-determined by the analyst’s reaction to the 
human’s transference, to the reality of the human’s life, to the reality of the analyst’s life, and to 
specific transference dispositions activated in the analyst as a reaction to the human and his/her 
material. Under ordinary circumstances, countertransference mostly is determined by the 
vicissitudes of the transference, and as such, the analyst’s emotional reactions may fluctuate 
significantly within each session.  
In contrast to acute fluctuations of the countertransference, chronic distortions of the analyst’s 
internal attitude toward the human usually indicate significant difficulties in the analyst’s 
understanding of the transference. They often point to a stalemate in the analytic situation that the 
analystmay need to resolve outside the actual times of analytic sessions with the human, through 
self-exploration or consultation. Serious characterological difficulties of the analyst may 
contribute to such chronic countertransference distortions, but most frequently they relate to more 
limited difficulties in his/her understanding and interpretations and are related to particular 
developments in the transference [13]. 
Full internal tolerance of countertransference reactions, including regressive fantasies about 
specific relations with the human, may be followed by the analyst’s internal exploration of the 
meanings of his/her reaction in terms of the present transference situation, and thus prepare the 
road for transference analysis. 
This is an overall outline of the basic aspects that essentially define psychoanalysis technique, 
and that may be applied to the analysis of various developments in the analytic situation of the 
society basing on scientific approach such as the analysis of dreams, character, acting out, and 
repetition compulsion, all of which, in the end, will culminate in transference analysis. 
The psychoanalysis scope 
The chapter provides the overview of scientists’ definition of psychoanalysis and its 
significant value in humans and world interaction. 
The scientific potential of psychoanalysis 
V.M. Leibin in one of his most fundamental works on psychoanalysis [8] notes that 
contradictory attitudes and mutually exclusive assessments regarding the heritage of S. Freud are 
primarily associated with permanent internal uncertainty and ambiguity inherent in 
psychoanalysis itself. This uncertainty can be stated already at the level of the basic ideas of 
Freud about the essence and purpose of his theory based on the definitions that he himself gives 
to psychoanalysis in various works.  
The term “psychoanalysis” was introduced by S. Freud in 1896 in an article on the etymology 
of neuroses. He had talked about psyche analysis, psychological analysis and hypnotic analysis 
before. S. Freud himself gives many definitions of psychoanalysis. But the most cited is he one 
contained in an encyclopedic article of 1922. Psychoanalysis is defined as: 
1) a way to study mental processes otherwise unavailable; 
2) a treatment for neurotic disorders based on this study; 
  
3) a series of psychological structures that have emerged as a result of this study gradually 
developing into a new scientific discipline [8]. 
However, Freud emphasizes that psychoanalysis is not limited only to the sphere of clinical, 
therapeutic use, but also to the sphere of science. Concluding the series of lectures on the 
introduction to psychoanalysis, he points out that psychoanalysis started as a therapy but he 
would recommend it not as a therapy but because of the truth in it, because of the explanations it 
gives us about things closest to a person, his/her own essence, and because of the connections 
that it reveals in the most diverse areas of person’s activity” [11]. 
Further, S. Freud emphasizes the ideological significance of psychoanalysis designed to 
complement the scientific worldview with knowledge about the spiritual life of a person, about 
the irrational forms of his being, about subjectivity which previously fell out of focus of attention 
of scientific disciplines. Thanks to psychoanalysis, the scientific worldview can claim to be a 
genuine unity and integrity of ideas about a person and his interaction with the outside world 
[11]. 
As a result, psychoanalysis in various sources is interpreted very widely: psychoanalysis 
means either a method of treating mental disorders, a system of knowledge about the human 
psyche, a method of researching the unconscious or the rules of interpretation of human activity, 
or a unique process of human interaction [8]. 
Of course, psychoanalytic explanations of the individual, social and cultural life phenomena 
are not exhaustive. They often seem fantastic and completely unscientific. However, this is 
human life itself which is not amenable to full rationalization. 
 The influence of individuals’ qualities on the social sphere of society 
People too often behave inadequately to circumstances, make illogical and unreasonable 
decisions, act impulsively, and it would be naive to assume that the qualities inherent in 
individuals do not have any influence on larger-scale phenomena of social life. Freud showed 
how many forms of behavior such as the home life of an ordinary man and a woman or the lives 
of gods, a single act of violence or extensive hostilities involving millions of people can be linked 
together in a generally accepted context that has a certain meaning. This model turned out to be 
satisfactory because it possessed internal logic, seemed to adequately explain the behavior and 
after getting used to unfamiliar terminology it makes you realise that Freud theory deals with 
things we unconsciously were aware of [10]. 
It can be said that psychoanalysis is a way of interpreting signs, semiotics or even the 
symptoms of culture. All modern culture is the subject of his research since all of it appears as a 
stream of images, symbols that need to be solved. Freud's view of society, art, religion and 
morality is the analyst's view which determines the symptoms and causes of the disease as well as 
the possibility of its treatment. 
The sphere of the rational in the life of a person is very limited. Very often behind the apparent 
clarity, common sense and obviousness there are hidden unconscious desires and aspirations 
which are the true determinants of human existence. 
The subject of psychoanalysis is limited to just such cases when the unconscious comes to the 
fore in the life of a person, society or culture. Then it is able to effectively solve these problems. 
But, if we accept such a pathology as a universal reality, psychoanalysis becomes a pseudo-
scientific and useless teaching.  
Object, subject of psychoanalysis and Freud's methodology 
The subject of psychoanalytic research is unconscious mental processes in the psyche. The 
psyche is understood as a complex, dynamic formation combining elements of objective and 
subjective reality. Psychic reality is fundamentally different from natural reality which was the 
  
main object for classical natural science. The phenomena of a person’s mental life (emotions, 
feelings and experiences) have a subjective meaning. They exist subjectively, and only in such a 
status are they the subject of scientific research. Myths, fairy tales, literature, political and 
religious beliefs, art become scientifically significant for a psychologist to the same extent that 
they do not correspond to the facts of external reality. So, the converse assertion follows: they are 
not a matter of psychologist as far as correspond to reality [7].  
However, as S. Freud showed, according to the principle of mental determinism, any mental 
phenomena and processes are not spontaneous, arbitrary, but have a definite reason hiding in the 
unconscious. These reasons can be identified by using a certain methodology and are described 
according to strict scientific principles, which Freud never abandoned. Freud was one of all the 
founders of the analytical schools who understood and comprehensively used the scientific 
method in his research. 
Freud's approach was as logical, and his findings were as thoroughly tested as in the case of 
Pavlov. But he was able to work successfully with the phenomena inaccessible to Pavlov. For, 
despite the refutations, the fact is that the foundations of his method — psychic determinism and 
the ruthless logic of free associations — are scientific ones encompassing a more extensive field 
of experience than anything before and after. 
To conclude, it is possible to state that this assessment is not completely indisputable but it 
once again emphasizes the inconsistency of psychoanalysis expressed in targeting at the syncretic 
unity of the epistemological and axiological in knowledge. In the methodology of psychoanalytic 
interpretation, this was expressed in the combination of the principle of determinism and 
hermeneutic interpretation in explaining the phenomena of human existence. 
 
2.3. Psychoanalysis in the context of the philosophy of science 
 
This chapter considers Lacan’s view on relationship between psychoanalysis and science as 
well as other scientists’ ideas on naturalism and hermeneutics from the point of view of 
psychoanalysis in the philosophy of science. 
Psychoanalysis and natural sciences 
The development of psychoanalytical theory by Freud was often associated with some 
concepts or metaphors that he took from the natural sciences, which exerted a strong influence in 
his thinking. Otherwise, Lacan’s inspiration in Levi-Strauss and Saussure’s structuralism, 
contributed decisively to give Lacanian psychoanalysis its own epistemological vocabulary that 
moved away from naturalistic influences [5]. 
Although Lacan had been interested in animal behavior and biology in the early days of his 
teaching, this interest was in the opposite direction of the naturalism present in some post-
Freudian psychoanalysts thinking. Differently from the adaptationist perspective present in the 
naturalistic inspiration of most post- Freudian authors, for Lacan human subjectivity is something 
that emerges as the effect of the symbolic order, constituting a break from the immediate plan of 
nature. 
However, if Lacan’s teaching was clearly marked by an antinaturalistic perspective, we could 
not say that he sustains that psychoanalysis should have an anti-scientific stance. We know that 
Freud thought that the worldview (Weltanschauung) of psychoanalysis should be no other than 
science’s one. At the end of the conference The question of a Weltanschauung Freud states that: 
“In my opinion, psychoanalysis is incapable of creating a Weltanschauung of its own. 
Psychoanalysis does not need one; it is part of science and can adhere to the scientific 
Weltanschauung” [7]. 
  
In the same direction, Lacan is emphatic in reproving those who claim that psychoanalysis 
should stand in a position of exteriority regarding the scientific field: “We say, contrary to what 
was invented on an alleged breaking of Freud with the scientism of his time, that it was this same 
scientism (...) which led Freud, as is shown in his writings, to open the way that will forever have 
his name. We say that this way has never left the ideals of this scientism since it is called like that 
and that the mark it brings form it is not contingent, but essential” [1]. 
For Lacan, the relationship between psychoanalysis and science rests on the epistemological 
discontinuity produced by the emergence of modern science which promoted a radical 
transformation in the modern conception of the subject that was essential for the emergence of 
psychoanalysis. The Cartesian cogito is considered by Lacan a key correlate to the emergence of 
modern science, which he characterizes as a moment of rejection of all traditional knowledge in 
order to establish a “grounding in being” for the subject. 
A subject, emptied of knowledge, devoid of content and representation, without substantial 
density, which only exists in the act: “I think, therefore I am.” This is the subject of science. And 
for Lacan this subject is none other than the subject upon which psychoanalysis itself operates: 
“That is why it was important to promote, first and foremost, and as a fact to be distinguished 
from the question of whether psychoanalysis is a science (if your field is scientific), just the fact 
that its practice does not imply another subject than the subject of science” [1]. 
The hermeneutical program in psychoanalysis 
 Before epistemological critiques of the philosophers who represent the standard conception of 
science (Carnap, 1956/1967; Grünbaum, 1984; Nagel, 1959/1964; Popper, 1963/1991), a large 
part of the psychoanalytic community seems to have seen its disciplinary status threatened, 
assuming that psychoanalysis should conform to the hegemonic parameters of natural-empirical 
science in order to reach a legitimate foundation for its theorizations and praxis. All this is made 
under the assumption that if it did not achieve being consolidated as a science, then it would lose 
its value.  
There were famous theorists who insisted on consummating the Freudian pretensions, 
assuming that psychoanalysis is, despite criticism, a “natural science of the psyche” [12]. 
Legitimizing their own executioner, some analysts found it necessary to clarify the 
metapsychological hypothesis so that they could overcome the epistemological obstacle. The 
work of David Rapaport (1960/1967) can be seen as an emblematic attempt to submissively 
dialogue with the inherited conception of science. In this case, an essay is perceived for 
maintaining the conceptual framework of metapsychology, whilst at the same time delimiting its 
empirical content in terms of controllable variables and direct observation.  
Paradoxically, the collaborators Rapaport, Merton Gill (1976), George Klein (1976), Roy 
Schafer (1976), Donald Spence (1984) and Philip Holzman (1985), were some of those who took 
the opposite direction: criticizing the biologizing conception of metapsychology, they attributed a 
scientific misunderstanding to Freud and rescued the clinical method with an exclusive emphasis 
on the idiosyncratic meaning of unique experiences. A flagrant contradiction was denounced in 
Freud between his way of theorizing and the way he proceeded in the clinic; a contradiction that 
enabled the development of hermeneutical psychoanalysis, while its beginning was in the work of 
the creator himself (although that position was not assumed by him). In this way, psychoanalysis 
was found in a scope different from that of the natural sciences, since it privileges the approach 
of the meaning. This methodology should not, therefore, emulate naturalistic procedures but 
arrives from a hermeneutical foundation [8].  
The hermeneutic or narrative version of psychoanalysis began to be sketched out in the 1960s 
and had the epistemological development of some philosophers such as Ricoeur (1969/2006) and 
  
Habermas (1968/1990) in its roots, who relied on the implications of the distinction between 
nature sciences and science of the spirit, sustained by authors like Dilthey (1883/1949), Rickert 
(1899/1943), Cassirer (1942/1973) and Collingwood (1946/1952). It resulted in a reformulation 
of the original program made by Freud to give valid answers to epistemological demands: it was 
an attempt to place psychoanalysis outside the orbit of discussions about its scientificity, arguing 
that it is an exegetical discipline, distinguishable from the natural sciences to which it should not 
aspire to belong. Hence, this movement is considered not as the effect of new conceptual 
developments, but as a true scope to the hermeneutics [16].  
It is clear that this position ratifies, paradoxically, the epistemological distinctions of the 
traditional conception of science: by admitting that psychoanalysis cannot be evaluated by the 
evidentiary criteria of the empirical-natural sciences, the conclusion is that this not a science and 
it should be recognized as an interpretative art. Both approaches seem to adhere to a conception 
of Galilean science, which privileges empirical certainty and experimental quantification. 
The hermeneutization of the sciences and of the philosophy of science 
There are a number of general aspects that most of the scientific disciplines and the philosophy 
of contemporary sciences have assumed from the hermeneutical tradition. Ulises Moulines, 
representative of the structuralist conception of the theories, has proposed that “the philosophy of 
science is essentially a part of the sciences of culture an interpretation of interpretations of 
reality” [3]; that is to say which gives it a hermeneutic nature in a wide sense. Moulines refers to 
epistemology or metaciency (as he calls it), but does not openly manifest something that seems to 
be involved: that sciences are essentially hermeneutical.  
This proposal is found in the developments of Ambrosio Velasco Gómez, who recognizes how 
the successive failures of the analytical-naturalist tradition in establishing objective criteria to 
distinguish truth and falsity, science and metaphysics, etc. That led to historical debates, show a 
significant convergence: “In these new attempts to explain scientific rationality, the most 
highlighted representatives of the philosophy of Anglo-Saxon science have turned towards an 
approach or convergence with central theses of an alternative tradition: the hermeneutics” [6]. 
This convergence, which seems appropriate to recover, seems to exist in at least four theses: 
1. All scientific research starts from conceptual quotes of various kinds (theoretical, 
methodological, axiological, etc) that are not always explicitly formulated but that guide in a 
decisive way the observation, formulation and testing of hypothesis; as well as decisions 
regarding the acceptance, rejection or modification of theories. 
2. The validity of a theory, its acceptance or rejection, cannot be established based on the 
degree of corroboration of its hypotheses about a strong and secure empirical basis. Such 
evaluation involves weighing the fertility of a proposal based on a broader framework (paradigm, 
research program, etc) and over time. 
3. Scientific rationality is determined by the way of resolving the general tensions between 
quotes and conventions of a tradition and the innovative proposals that emerge within it as a 
result of research. As long as the way to resolution contributes to progressive changes of 
tradition, in terms of empirical adequacy and heuristic capacity, scientific activity will be a 
rational enterprise. 
4. The essential tensions in a tradition, for example, between the previously accepted and 
innovation, or between the explanatory hypotheses and the interpretation of what is observed etc, 
cannot be solved by some methodological, precise and invariant procedure. The successful 
resolution of such controversies depends on a prudent judgment of the competent scientific 
community, through its communicative, argumentative, persuasive and consensual processes, 
which transcend any strictly methodological criterion [6].  
  
According to Velasco Gómez, these points of convergence between the hermeneutic (post-
heideggerian) and naturalists (post-positivist) traditions of the philosophy of science are a good 
indication to explore a new general notion of scientific rationality, in the field of natural sciences 
and in socio-historical sciences in different way. His proposal is to take not the methodological 
and demonstrative argumentation as a foundation, but “the argumentation communicative, public, 
deliberative, not demonstrative, but convincing, that traditionally has been associated to the 
practical knowledge and not to scientific theories” [6]. Beyond this proposition, with which we 
adhere to its spirit but we do not aim to develop in the terms of the author, we believe that the 
hermeneutization of the philosophy of science must also reach the epistemology of 
psychoanalysis, showing a way to transcend the efforts to reduce the disciplinary identity to the 
extremes in tension. However, it must be said that this programmatic belt is far from having been 
settled, since specific problems remain to be solved. 
Gabriel Zanotti also referred to a similar movement of hermeneutization, emphasizing that the 
rediscovery of non-algorithmic rationality occurred within the very heart of the analytical 
philosophy of science: what is interesting about the contemporary epistemological debate is that 
the discovery of a more elastic, broader notion of science was not from “outside” science. It was 
not the insightful words of Gadamer, in 1960, which awakened the science of its dogmatic dream. 
The debate Popper-Kuhn-Lakatos-Feyerabend that, precisely from the 60’s, takes a great 
momentum, was the product of the seeds planted by Popper himself in his debate with neo-
positivism [19].  
All this must lead, according to Zanotti, to explore the role of prudential rationality in 
scientific activity. 
The healthy convergence analyzed by authors such as Velasco Gómez and Zanotti should lead 
us to clear up at least two common ways of misunderstanding: first, those chimerical ideas that 
some analysts have made about the philosophy of natural sciences, either to imitate them, or to 
oppose them in the epistemological discussions about psychoanalysis. Second, the unnecessary 
radicalization of the hermeneutic perspective as a basis for psychoanalysis, whose apex of 
rationality culminates in a rejection of any pretense of objectivity that is not consistent with 
clinical experience or cannot serve as a basic assumption for psychoanalytic research. 
It must be said, moreover, that philosophical hermeneutics has not allowed for psychoanalysis 
to give an accurate and non-evasive response to the epistemological critiques of the 
representatives of the traditional conception of science (such as Popper and Grünbaum, for 
example), nor to be lined up with the inescapable naturalistic elements that are present since the 
Freudian theorization. If psychoanalysis has to have a hermeneutical foundation, this is because it 
tends to share the aforementioned theses about the rationality of knowledge and its evolution, 
inherent to the hermeneutization of the philosophy of science. However, it is not prevented from 
including anthropological, methodological and axiological assumptions of the hermeneutic 
tradition before its own basic conjectures based on the immanent rationality of his field of 
clinical experience.  
In other words, psychoanalysis is hermeneutic in a broad sense and like any other scientific 
discipline; but it cannot be hermeneutic in the strict sense since it cannot reconcile some of its 
central assumptions with the foundations of this tradition. 
Given this hypothesis, it should be recognized that the very development of the history of the 
philosophy of science shows that some of the central aspects that sustained the controversy 
between naturalism and hermeneutics are not completely excluded or can transcend it.  
 
3. Discussions 
  
 
To sum up, it is possible to conclude that we are dealing with a special “psychoanalytic 
reality” including the body-emotional level of experience and trauma, the level of repression (the 
work of the unconscious) and the level of conscious cognitive activity between the analyst and 
the patient. This reality is neither physical nor mental. The psychoanalytic fact is set by the 
analysis situation and theoretical constructs that the analyst uses to interpret the patient's 
statements. Traditional criteria for adjusting theory and empirical basis do not make sense in this 
case. They will always be consistent even in cases of an obviously failed treatment process (as 
the most important result and the criterion of truth). 
The research proved that such a controversial nature of psychoanalytic research provoked the 
involvement of various methodological innovations in the process of cognition. The ambivalence 
of psychoanalysis predetermined its interdisciplinary status, the need to integrate knowledge from 
various disciplines, and predetermined the need for axiologization of cognition since 
psychoanalysis turned to the spiritual world of man and society with scientific tools. Finally, the 
need to address   individuality, a unique fate, the dynamics of personal development in the 
process of psychoanalytic research predetermined the development of a model of situational 
research, a method of “case study” widely used in modern scientific research. Analysis of the 
experience of using data innovations in psychoanalytic research can be of great importance for 
modern science and philosophy mastering complex objects of reality. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
It is shown that orthodox doctrine of S. Freud contains the main heuristic potential of 
psychoanalysis. It is no coincidence that all the successors and reformers of psychoanalysis as 
well as critics turned directly to the work of the founder of the teaching. However, the concept of 
S. Freud like any new theory was not without its drawbacks caused, first of all, by the complexity 
of the problems under consideration, the falsity of some initial provisions and the uncertainty of 
terminology. The subsequent development of psychoanalysis revealed and eliminated many of 
these shortcomings, and also highlighted the advantages and prospects of the psychoanalytic 
approach more clearly. Therefore, the continuation of discussions about the scientific nature of 
Freudianism, as well as open disregard for psychoanalysts by scientists and philosophers could be 
considered impractical and hindering their constructive interaction. 
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